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1. Introduction
This paper evaluates the age-old suspicion that cooperation in R&D leads to
product market collusion. Prior to the 1960s this suspicion was so strong in the U.S. that
antitrust authorities threatened to punish any form of research joint ventures (RJVs) with
full forces of antitrust laws. The sentiment abated during the 1960s and early 1970s,
when key American industries were losing the competitive edge to foreign rivals that had
made considerable technological progress through formation of RJVs.1 Although today
joint R&D activities among firms are encouraged everywhere, the same old suspicion
lingers: does cooperation in R&D facilitate product market collusion?2
To investigate this question analytically, suppose that a group of ex ante
symmetric firms manage implicitly to maintain a collusive equilibrium in an infinitely
repeated-game framework. In such an environment, a firm that discovers a cost-cutting
technology has a strong incentive to lower the price to increase its market share, thereby
destabilizing the collusive arrangement. Further, the prospect that collusion breaks down
with a discovery of new technology destabilizes collusion in pre-discovery periods.
Suppose that firms are allowed to form an RJV to share innovations. Cooperation
in R&D generates two effects that facilitate collusion. First, innovation sharing eliminates
the inter-firm asymmetry, the source of collusion instability mentioned above. Second,
innovation sharing gives all firms access to new technology and increases industry profit,
the prospect of which contributes to the stability of collusion.3
                                                 
1 See Caloghirou, Ioannides and Vonortas (2003).
2 For example, see the Federal Trade Commission’s Comment and Hearings on Joint Venture Project to
witness its continuing ambivalence towards RJVs (http//www.ftc.gov/os/1997/jointven.htm).
3 I am grateful toYeon-koo Che for this insight.
2To separate these two effects, we consider the intermediate case in which firms
license new technology without forming an RJV. Licensing allows industry to capture as
much total surplus as it could as an RJV, but does not eliminate the asymmetry that exists
between licensor and licensee. This asymmetry makes it more difficult for firms to
maintain collusion relative to when they form an RVJ.
Welfare and policy implications of cooperative R&D are also considered.
Although it facilitates collusion, an RJV also increases production efficiency, so social
welfare need not fall. With licensing possibilities, however, an RJV never increases
social welfare because industry productivity is already high with licensing.
These results are established in a model under the assumptions that innovation is
non-drastic, the innovator has exclusive rights to the innovation for an indefinite period,
and the collusive equilibrium is maintained with threats to Nash reversion. These
assumptions are relaxed and the implications discussed later in the analysis.
There is a scanty literature on the relationship between cooperation in R&D and
product market collusion.4 Martin (1995) uses a continuous-time version of a repeated-
game framework with stochastic innovation to show, as in this paper, that cooperative
R&D facilitates collusion. Contrary to our result, he finds that formation of RJVs reduces
social welfare. The difference in welfare assessments lies with his assumption that
collusion ends with a discovery.5 If innovation is non-drastic, collusion need not end with
                                                 
4 There is a huge literature on the relative effect of competitive and cooperative R&D, most of which
studies atemporal models, see, e.g., D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), and Kamien, Muller and Zang
(1992). An intertemporal model is developed in Miyagiwa and Ohno (2002).
5 Cabral (2000) considers a similar model under the assumption that firms cannot observe each other’s
effort, and shows that firms may set the price below the monopoly price to sustain collusion under
cooperative R&D.
3a discovery of new technology, in which case welfare can be increased by formation of
RJVs as we show below.
While Martin (1995) focuses exclusively on the stability of collusion before
innovation, the stability of collusion after innovation takes center stage in the work of
Lambertini, Poddar and Sasaki (2002, 2003). In the 2002 article, which more relates to
the present paper, the authors consider a three-stage game, in which two firms first decide
whether to form a joint venture, then choose horizontal locations in the Hotelling-style
product space, and finally choose to compete or collude in prices over time. R&D is
deterministic, and corresponds to product location selection. In the second stage, firms
can select a product location freely when acting competitively in R&D but are
constrained to choose a single location when acting as an RJV. When competitive in
R&D, collusive firms have no incentive to locate near the center of the product space,
because that would only increase profits from a deviation without increasing the
equilibrium profit.6 Therefore, an RJV, which constrains firms to select an identical
product location (at the center), makes collusion more difficult to maintain. Their model
however offers no analysis of collusion in pre-discovery periods or the linkages between
behaviors in pre-discovery and post-discovery periods.7
                                                 
6 Locating at the center, each firm covers half the interval, but the same result obtains if each firm locates at
the midpoint between the center and the end point of the interval. However, in the latter case profit from a
deviation is less due to product differentiation.
7 Lambertini, Poddar and Sasaki (2003) develop a non-spatial model of product differentiation, where
formation of an RJV is assumed and focus is on the firms’ (costly) choice of product substitutability for the
maintenance of collusion in post-discovery periods.
4A major difficulty that arises in the analysis of collusion in post-discovery periods
is that there is no natural focal equilibrium due to cost asymmetries.8 There is a small but
growing literature on collusion under cost heterogeneity, which typically assumes that
firms maximize joint profits, and determines the unique equilibrium price and market-
sharing rule by an appeal to the notion of balanced temptation equilibrium of Friedman
(1971)9. Bae (1987) initiates this approach in his analysis of Bertrand duopoly, while
Verboven (1997), Rothschild (1999) and Collie (2004) examine Cournot cases. This
approach however is not without criticism. Harrington (1991), for example, argues that
the hypotheses of joint profits maximization and balanced temptation equilibrium are
both ad hoc, and develops an alternative approach based on Nash bargaining.
However, the Harrington (1991) approach may also be subject to a subtler
criticism that it does not model the negotiation process explicitly. If it takes long and hard
negotiations to come to an agreement, such a process is likely to raise suspicion in the
watchful eyes of antitrust authorities, thereby affecting the equilibrium outcome.
Furthermore, when applied to the current situation, both the Nash bargaining and the
joint-profit maximization approach turn out intractable because of ambiguous
comparative-statics results with respect to cost changes. Therefore, in this paper we
propose another approach, which may be called the price leadership hypothesis. Under
this hypothesis, an innovator chooses a price and a market-share rule to maximizes his
individual profit and makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the non-innovator. The price
                                                 
8 This difficulty is absent in Martin (1995) because collusion ends with a discovery in his model, and in
Lambertini, Poddar and Sasaki (2002) because R&D is non-stochastic and R&D decisions are made
simultaneously.
5leadership hypothesis is robust to the Harrington (1991) criticism and is more tractable
than his or the joint-profit maximization approach.
The remainder of this paper is organized in six sections. In section 2 we give an
overview of the model and discuss the non-cooperative equilibrium. Section 3 establishes
the conditions for the collusive equilibrium under competitive R&D. Section 4 is devoted
to the analysis of firms’ incentives to collude as an RJV. Section 5 examines the case in
which firms can license new technology without forming an RJV. In Section 6, we extend
the model to cases of drastic innovation, finite-period patent protection, and optimal
punishment schemes. Section 7 concludes.
2. Model
2.1 Setup
We consider repeated interactions between two a priori symmetric firms over an
infinite time horizon. Time is discrete and indexed by t ≥ 1. At t = 1 firms possess the
common technology that enables them to produce homogeneous goods at the constant
unit cost of c–. In any period t ≥ 1, each firm decides whether to invest in R&D for the
discovery of a new technology that will reduce the unit cost to c– (< c–). Investing in R&D
requires a fixed cost k per period.10 R&D investment is risky in the sense that it fails with
probability φ < 1 per period. If both firms invest in R&D, a discovery occurs to either
                                                                                                                                                  
9 This requires that the ratios of the per-period losses due to the breakdown of collusion over the maximum
one-period gains from deviations be the same among firms.
10 The assumption of fixed-intensity R&D, adopted in Bloch and Markowitz (1996), Lambertini, Poddar
and Sasaki (2002, 2003) and others, simplifies the analysis.
6firm with probability 2φ(1 – φ) and to both with probability (1 – φ)2. In the case of
simultaneous discoveries each firm has an equal chance of obtaining patent protection.11
Call a firm with the patent an innovator, and the other firm a non-innovator. Assume
permanent patent protection for simplicity.
Firms are price-setters. Consumers buy from a firm offering a lower price. In case
of ties, they buy from both firms equally so each firm captures half the market. Demand
is stationary and is written D(p), where p is price. D(p) is differentiable, with first and
second derivatives denoted by D’(p) < 0 and D”(p) ≤ 0. Let pm(c) be the unconstrained
monopoly price when the unit cost is c, i.e., pm(c) ≡ argmax D(p)(p – c). The conditions
on demand make industry profit strictly concave so pm(c) is unique. It is easy to check
that pm(c–) < pm(c–).
Lastly, if innovation is drastic, an innovator becomes a monopoly unthreatened by
the non-innovator and hence has no incentive to collude in post-discovery periods. To
study the linkages between pre-discovery and post-discovery behaviors, assume that
innovation is non-drastic, i.e., c– < pm(c–).
2.2 Non-collusive equilibrium
In the non-collusive game, each firm setting prices equal to c– in every period
regardless of histories is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). Denote this
                                                 
11 This assumption is often adopted in the literature; see Cardon and Sasaki (1998), for example.
7strategy profile by λ. Adopting this strategy, firms earn zero profit (excluding the
investment cost k) before a discovery. After a discovery the innovator limit-prices the
non-innovator and earns the per-period profit of
πL = D(c–)(c– – c–) > 0
while the non-innovator receives zero profits.12
Assuming that both firms invest in R&D, with probability (1 – φ2)/2 each firm has
the chance of obtaining the exclusive right to use the new technology and earning the per-
period profit πL. With probability φ
2 investments flop for both firms, putting them in
exactly the same state the next period as they are currently. This recursive structure of the
model leads to the following equation:
(1) Vλ = – k + δ(πL/2)(1 – φ2)/(1 – δ) + δφ2Vλ,
where Vλ denotes the present discounted sum of equilibrium profits, and δ (< 1) denotes
the common discount factor. Collecting terms,
Vλ = 
−k + δ (1−φ 2 )(π L / 2) / (1− δ )
1− δφ 2 .
Assume Vλ > 0 so investing in R&D is worthwhile for each firm.
3. Collusion with non-cooperative R&D
                                                 
12 Strictly speaking, the innovator sets a price slightly below c– to capture the entire market.
8We now consider a class of trigger strategies with Nash threats that induce
implicit collusion in pre-discovery and post-discovery periods. We begin with non-
cooperative R&D.
3.1. Collusion in post-discovery periods
In post-discovery periods firms have asymmetric costs. As stated in section 1 we
focus on the equilibrium based on the price leadership hypothesis, under which the
innovator chooses a price and a market-share rule to maximize his profit and makes a
take-it-or-leave-it offer to the non-innovator.13 Let (pc, s) denote such an offer, where s (0
< s < 1) is the fraction of market served by the innovator.
The price leadership hypothesis amounts to the following. As soon as he has
discovered new technology, the innovator communicates his optimal price and market-
share rule to the non-innovator and executes this decision in the first post-discovery
period. If the non-innovator responds with the same price and the prescribed sales, then
the collusion is on. Otherwise, the innovator believes that the non-innovator is
uninterested in colluding, and starts behaving competitively. Formally, we consider the
following strategy profile. Given that there is a discovery in period τ ≥ 1, in period τ + 1
firms set a price equal to pc and split the market according to the market-sharing rule s. In
t ≥ τ + 2, they choose (pc, s) if no other outcomes than (pc, s) have been observed since τ
+ 1; otherwise they adopt the non-collusive strategy λ forever. Denote this strategy
profile by a (a mnemonic for “after” a discovery).
9We look for the condition that makes a subgame-perfect in post-discovery games.
If firms adopt a, every (post-discovery) subgame belongs to one of the two classes; one in
which all past outcomes have been (pc, s), and one in which another outcome has been
observed at least in one post-discovery period. In the latter, λ is subgame-perfect, so we
need only to show that a is subgame-perfect in the first class of subgames.
Along this collusive equilibrium path, the innovator earns the per-period profit of
πi = sD(p
c)(pc – c–)
while the non-innovator earns
πn = (1 - s)D(p
c)(pc – c–).
Since pc maximizes πi, put p
c = pm(c–). Then, we can write the above profits as
πi  = sm–, and πn = (1 – s)D[pm(c–)][pm(c–) - c–],
where m– denotes the monopoly profit under the new technology:
m– ≡ D[pm(c–)][pm(c–) - c–].
Let vi and vn denote the sums of equilibrium profits for the innovator and the non-
innovator, respectively. The recursive structure implies
vi = πi + δvi,  and vn = πn + δvn,
and hence:
                                                                                                                                                  
13 As explained in section 1 the main reason for this hypothesis is in its analytical tractability. By design,
this scheme maximizes total profit for the innovator supported by Nash threats but is not optimal in the
sense of Abreu (1986, 1988). The optimal collusion scheme is considered in section 6.
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vi = πi/(1 - δ) and vn = πn/(1 - δ).
Now consider a one-period deviation. A non-innovator can set the price slightly
below pm(c–) to capture the entire market for the one-period profit of D[pm(c–)][pm(c–) - c–]
but will lose all future profits when it gets limit-priced. He thus has no incentive to
deviate if vn  ≥ D[pm(c–)][pm(c–) - c–], which simplifies to
(2) δ ≥ s.
On the other hand, a deviating innovator can earn m– one period and πLin all subsequent
periods. Therefore, the innovator has no incentive to deviate if
vi ≥ m–  + δπL/(1 - δ),
or
δ ≥ (1 – s)m–/(m– – πL)
Thus, a is subgame-perfect in post-discovery games if
(3) δ ≥ max {(1 – s)m–/(m– – πL), s}.
Now, the innovator chooses s to maximize sm– subject to the non-innovator’s
incentive compatibility condition (2). This puts s = δ. Substituting s = δ in (3) and
rearranging yields
(4) δ ≥ m–/(2m– – πL) ≡ δA(c–) > 1/2.
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The strategy profile a is a SPNE if (4) is satisfied. Observe that δA(c–) > 1/2. Given the
standard result that symmetric Bertrand firms can maintain collusion for δ ≥ 0, (4)
indicates that a cost asymmetry makes collusion more difficult to maintain.
Define cd by c– = pm(cd). Then c– > cd implies innovation is non-drastic. The next
proposition summarizes what we have found so far.
Proposition 1: Assume non-drastic innovation (c– > cd).
(i) The strategy profile a is a SPNE for δ ≥ m–/(2m– – πL) ≡ δA(c–) > 1/2.
(ii) The collusive equilibrium price and market-sharing rule are
pc = pm(c–) and s = δ > 1/2.
Since s > 1/2, the innovator has a greater market share than the non-innovator, a result
that is consistent with the findings of Bae (1987) and Harrington (1991). The per-period
equilibrium profits are
πi = δm– and πn = (1 - δ)D[pm(c–)][pm(c–) - c–].
Observe that the equilibrium profits to each firm are sensitive to the prevailing discount
factor, whereas in Bae (1987) and Harrington (1991) they are independent of it as long as
the discount factor exceeds the threshold level.
12
The locus AA in Figure 1 plots δA(c–) against c–.14 The depiction reflects the fact
that:
∂δA(c–)/∂c– = D(c–)D[pm(c–)][c– - pm(c–)]/(2m– - πL)2 < 0
for pm(c–) > c– (i.e., non-drastic innovation). It is easy to check that δA(c–) increases
towards unity as c– falls towards cdwhile in the other direction it approaches 1/2 as c–
approaches c–. The intuition is straightforward. The greater a cost reduction, the more of
an incentive to deviate the innovator has. To curb this incentive the threshold discount
factor δA(c–) must rise.
Proposition 1 says that if δ < δA(c–) firms cannot collude at the monopoly price
pm(c–), but it leaves open the question whether they can collude at another price.
However, such partial collusion is impossible as stated in the next lemma. Intuitively,
because the market-sharing rule is sensitive to the discount factor in the present model,
the innovator cannot commit credibly to his offer when the discount factor falls below the
critical level δA(c–). (The proof in Appendix A.)
Lemma 1. If δ < δA(c–), partial collusion is impossible in post-discovery subgames.
                                                 
14 We limit analysis to δ ≥ 1/2.
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3.2. Collusion in pre-discovery periods
We now turn to the stability of collusion in pre-discovery periods. Consider the
following symmetric strategy: In t = 1, set a price equal to pm(c–), the monopoly price
under the old technology. In any pre-discovery period t ≥ 2, there are four possible states
of nature.
(i) No other prices than pm(c–) have been observed and there was a discovery in t – 1.
(ii) No other prices than pm(c–) have been observed and there has been no discovery to
date.
(iii) Prices other than pm(c–) have been observed at least once in the past and there was a
discovery in t – 1.
(iv) Prices other than pm(c–) have been observed at least once in the past and there has
been no discovery to date.
In state (i), adopt a. In state (ii) set the price equal to pm(c–). In states (iii) and (iv) adopt
λ. Call this strategy profile b (a mnemonic for “before” a discovery).
Since b is subgame-perfect in states (i), (iii) and (iv), we need only to check state
(ii). In state (ii) the equilibrium payoff, denoted by Vc, satisfies this recursive equation
(5) Vc = m–/2 − k + δ(1 − φ2)(vi + vn)/2 + δφ2Vc,
where m– denotes the monopoly profit under the old technology; i.e.,
m– = D[pm(c–)][pm(c–) – c–).
14
The right-hand side of (5) states that in every period before a discovery each firm earns
half the monopoly profit m– less the R&D cost, and that each is equally likely to be the
innovator or the non-innovator the next period, given probability of discovery (1 − φ2).
Collecting terms in (5) yields
Vc = 
m/2 −  k + δ(1−φ 2 )(vi  + vn )/2
1 - δφ 2 .
Consider now a one-period deviation. By lowering the price infinitesimally below
the monopoly price pm(c–), a deviating firm earns (m– – k) in the current period but finds
itself in state (iii) or state (iv) the next period, with a switch to λ. Thus, the following is
the expected profits from a deviation:
m– − k + δ(1 − φ2)(πL/2)/(1 − δ) + δφ2Vλ = m– + Vλ
where the equality follows from (1). A deviation is unprofitable if this profit is less than
Vc, i.e.,
(6) Vc – Vλ ≥  m–,
where
(7) Vc – Vλ = 
δ(1 – φ2)[vi + vn - πL/(1 – δ)]/2 + m–/2
1 – δφ2 .
The difference in profits, Vc – Vλ, between the collusive and the competitive paths
increases without bounds as δ goes to unity. Then, (6) holds with strict inequality for a
high enough δ < 1. On the other hand, when δ is sufficiencly close to 1/2,  (6) fails, as
15
shown in Appendix B. Therefore, there exists a unique δ ∈(1/2, 1) at which (6) holds with
strict equality. Denote this threshold discount factor by δB(c–).
The locus BB (comprising the thick and dotted segments) in Figure 1 plots δB(c–)
against c–, assuming that firms maintain the collusive equilibrium in post discovery
periods and that φ2 ≥ 1/2. The depiction is based on the following lemma (see Appendix
C for a proof):
Lemma 2: Given that cd < c– <  c–
(i) ∂δB(c–)/∂c– < 0
(ii) 1/2 < δB(c–) < 1/(2φ2).
(iii) If φ2 ≥ 1/2, there is a point (c–, δ(c–)) at which the loci AA and BB intersect.15
Thus, the locus BB curves upward as c– falls but stays strictly between 1/2 and 1/(2φ2). If
φ2 < 1/2, however, the upper bound exceeds unity, implying that the locus BB may stay
above the locus AA for all c– > cd.
                                                 
15 This establishes the existence. There may be more than one such point. However, the results we show
below do not depend on the uniqueness.
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Finally, the analysis of this subsection is predicated on there being collusion in
post-discovery periods, i.e., δ ≥ δA(c–). Thus, we have
Proposition 2: If δ ≥  max {δA(c–), δB(c–)} > 1/2, the strategy profile b is subgame-perfect
and entails collusion in pre-discovery and post-discovery periods.
The prospect that a cost asymmetry can destabilize collusion in post-discovery
periods makes collusion more difficult to maintain in pre-discovery periods, during which
costs are symmetric. In Figure 1, collusion is sustainable before and after a discovery if
the (δ, c–) pair is in region 1 defined by the set {(δ, c–)| δ ≥  max {δA(c–), δB(c–)}}. Outside
region 1, the strategy profile b cannot support full collusion. In region 2 defined by the
set {(δ , c–)| δA(c–) ≤ δ  < δB(c–)}, for example, firms can maintain collusion after a
discovery but cannot before a discovery, because the monopoly price pm(c–) cannot
satisfy the no-deviation condition (6). The question is: can firms collude partially, that is,
at a price different from the monopoly price pm(c–) until there is a discovery? As in the
post-discovery game, the next lemma shows they cannot (the proof in Appendix D).
Lemma 3. If δA(c–) ≤ δ < δB(c–) there is no partial collusion in pre-discovery periods.
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Thus, in region 2, although they cannot collude in pre-discovery periods, firms can fully
collude in post-discovery periods by playing a competitive one-shot game until there is a
discovery and then switch to playing a. This is a SPNE, yielding zero profits (minus
investment cost k) until a discovery and m–/2 per period afterwards.
Outside of regions 1 and 2, firms cannot collude partially after a discovery. Given
that they play a limit-price game after a discovery, however, firms may still be able to
collude up to a discovery by playing (the pre-discovery components of) b until a
discovery and then switching to λ. Since firms adopting this strategy play the limit-
pricing game after a discovery, the first term in the numerator of (7) vanishes, and the
condition to support collusion in pre-discovery period is given by
(m–/2)/(1 − δφ2) > m–,
instead of by (6). This inequality holds if δ ≥ 1/(2 φ2). This condition is satisfied if the
(δ, c–) pair is in region 3 of Figure 1 defined by {(δ, c–)| 1/(2 φ2) ≤ δ < δA(c–)}, which is
non-empty if φ is greater than 2 /2. Outside all these regions firms cannot collude at all.
4. Research joint ventures
We interpret the RJV broadly to encompass any technology-sharing arrangement
including a royalty-free cross-licensing agreement, under which each firm runs its own
research lab, incurs own R&D costs and gains free access to any innovations made by
18
partners. We thus assume that each firm retains its R&D facility and shares technology
with each other, as is commonly assumed in the RVJ literature.16
4.1 Collusion in post-discovery periods
Suppose there is a discovery in period τ ≥ 1 and the firms adopt the following
post-discovery strategy, denoted by α.  In τ + 1, set a price equal to the monopoly price
pm(c–) under the new technology. In all t + τ,  (t ≥ 2), choose pm(c–) if no other prices than
pm(c–) have been observed since τ + 1; otherwise set a price to c–. Thus, α is a standard
collusive strategy profile for symmetric price-setting duopoly and is a SPNE for δ ≥ 1/2.
Compared with Proposition 1, this result shows that formation of an RJV facilitates
collusion in post-discovery periods by preventing a cost asymmetry from arising. The
question is how low the threshold discount factor falls in pre-discovery periods. We turn
to this question next.
4.2 Collusion in pre-discovery periods
Consider the following collusive strategy denote by β: In t = 1, set a price equal to
the monopoly price pm(c–) under the old technology. In any pre-discovery period t ≥ 2,
there are four possible states of nature.
(i) No other prices than pm(c–) have been observed, and there was a discovery in t – 1.
(ii) No other prices than pm(c–) have been observed and there has been no discovery to
date.
                                                 
16 See Kamien, Muller and Zang (1992) and Miyagiwa and Ohno (2002), for example.
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(iii) Prices other than pm(c–) have been observed at least in one period in the past and
there was a discovery in t – 1.17
(iv) Prices other than pm(c–) have been observed at least once in the past and there has
been no discovery to date.
In state (i) adopt α. In state (ii) set a price equal to pm(c–). In state (iii) set a price equal to
c– in every period. In state (iv), withdraw from the RJV and switch to playing λ forever.
The strategy profile β is subgame-perfect in states (i), (iii) and (iv), so we only
need to check state (ii). In that state, VJ, the equilibrium profit per firm, satisfies the
following recursive equation:
VJ = m–/2 – k + δ(1 − φ2)(m–/2)/(1 - δ) + δφ2VJ,
which indicates that each firms earn half the monopoly profit m– less the R&D cost before
a discovery and also splits the post-discovery profit. Collecting terms, we obtain
VJ = 
m / 2 − k + δ (1−φ 2 )(m / 2) / (1− δ )
1− δφ 2 .
A one-period deviation before a discovery raises a deviating firm’s profit to m– but
puts firms in states (iii) or (iv) the next period, depending on whether there is a discovery
during the period in question. In state (iii), which occurs with probability (1 − φ2), firms
share the innovation but a switch to playing the one-shot symmetric Bertrand game
                                                 
17 Here, a subtle question arises: who owns the innovation when a deviation occurs. We assume that
innovation is shared since it has occurred before breakup of the RJV.
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forever wipes out all future profits. In state (iv), which arises with probability φ2, firms
switch to the non-collusive strategy λ, which has the prevent value of Vλ. Thus, a
deviation yields the profit of
m–  – k + δφ2Vλ.
A firm therefore has no incentive to deviate if
 VJ ≥ m–  – k + δφ2Vλ.
After arranging terms, this condition can be rewritten
(8) δ(1 - φ2)(m–/2)/(1 - δ) + δφ2(VJ – Vλ) ≥ m–/2
where
VJ – Vλ = 
δ(1 - φ2)(m–/2 - πL/2)/(1 - δ) + m–/2 
1 - δφ2 .
Differentiation shows that the left-hand side of (8) is increasing in δ  for the same
reason explicated in the case of non-cooperative R&D. Further, we prove, in Appendix E,
that (8) holds with strict inequality at δ = 1/2 . Thus, (8) holds with strict inequality for all
δ ≥ 1/2. Hence,
Proposition 3. The strategy β is subgame perfect for δ ≥  1/2
Thus, formation of an RJV lowers the threshold discount factors both in pre-discovery
and in post-discovery periods to 1/2 for all c– > cd. A comparison with the non-
21
cooperative case, in which the threshold discount factor exceeds 1/2, indicates that
cooperative R&D leads to collusion everywhere outside region 1. It is in this sense that
formation of an RJV facilitates collusion.
Proposition 4. Formation of an RJV facilitates collusion for all c– > cd  if
1/2 ≤ δ <  max {δA(c–), δB(c–)}.
4.3 Welfare implications
Collusion reduces social welfare as firms set the monopoly price. However, it
should not be inferred that cooperation in R&D should be banned or penalized, for
sharing of new can increase social welfare by making not just the innovator but both
firms more efficient. The net welfare impact of cooperation in R&D thus depends on both
these factors.
In region 1 of Figure 1, firms collude before and after a discovery without
cooperation in R&D. Therefore, formation of an RJV does not exacerbate the market
distortions, and the technology-sharing effect raises welfare. In region 2, without
cooperation in R&D firms manage to maintain collusion only after a discovery. Then, by
the efficiency argument, welfare must rise with formation of an RJV in post-discovery
periods. However, welfare falls in pre-discovery periods as firms collude as an RJV. The
net welfare impact is in general ambiguous.
In region 3, without cooperation in R&D firms can collude only before a
discovery. Thus, formation of an RJV generates no welfare change before a discovery. In
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post-discovery periods, firms collude only as an RJV. While monopoly pricing reduces
welfare, technology sharing increases welfare. In this particular case, however, industry
without an RJV is just as efficient as with an RJV, because due to limit-pricing only the
innovator is active. Therefore, formation of an RJV results only in monopoly pricing,
reducing welfare.18 To show this formally, let p(x) = D-1(p) be the inverse demand
function. Then social welfare without formation of the RJV is given by
WC = p(x)dx − D(c)c + D(c)(c
0
D(c)
∫ − c)
where the first two terms on the right is consumer surplus and the third is industry profit.
Similarly, social welfare with the RJV is written
WJ = p(x)dx − D[pm (c)]pm (c) + D[pm (c)][pm (c)
0
D[ pm (c)]
∫ − c] .
Taking the difference,
WJ – WC = − p(x)dx + {D(c) − D[pm (c)]}
D[ pm (c)]
D(c)
∫ c .
Since p(x) between the limits of integration is greater than c–, we have
p(x)dx
D[ pm (c)]
D(c)
∫ > cdx
D[ pm (c)]
D(c)
∫ = {D(c) − D[pm (c)]}c .
Therefore, WJ – WC < 0; although having no welfare effect in the pre-discovery phase,
formation of an RJV reduces post-discovery welfare. Similarly, welfare falls
unambiguously outside the three regions.
                                                 
18 As observed by Yeon-Koo Che, this is strictly due to price competition. If the non-innovator also
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  To sum, an RJV increases welfare only by making the whole industry more
efficient instead of just the innovator through innovation sharing. Although a large cost
reduction can therefore result in a greater welfare improvement, with a large cost
reduction we are likely to be in regions 3 and 4 initially, where formation of an RJV
lowers welfare as we saw above. Thus we have a counterintuitive result: sharing a cost-
cutting technology under R&D cooperation drives welfare improvements, but with a
large cost reduction welfare is likely to fall with formation of an RJV. In contrast, with a
small cost reduction, firms are likely to be collusive anyway, so formation of an RJV has
only the beneficial technology-sharing effect. This observation has the obvious policy
implication for antitrust authorities: firms should be more closely monitored for
anticompetitive behavior when an RJV aims at a major technological breakthrough.
5. Licensing without RJVs19
In this section, we allow firms to license innovation without forming an RJV. As
mentioned in section 1, formation of an RJV in preceding sections facilitates collusion
through two effects. One is the asymmetry story. Innovation sharing eliminates inter-firm
asymmetry, a source of instability. The other is the efficiency story; the prospect of a
greater industry profit in post-discovery periods makes collusion easier to maintain in
pre-discovery periods.
Licensing allows both firms to use innovation, thereby making industry as
efficient as with an RJV. However, with licensing there remains an inter-firm asymmetry
                                                                                                                                                  
produced, an RJV improves production efficiency so the welfare might increase.
19 I thank Yeon-koo Che for his suggestion to explore this issue.
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in profit between the innovator (licensor) and the non-innovator (licensee). We show that
this asymmetry makes collusion more difficult to maintain with licensing than with an
RJV in pre-discovery periods but not in post-discovery periods.
The analysis of this section follows that of section 3. However, to save space we
replicate only the relevant part from that section. With licensing, a rich taxonomy of
cases may also arise, depending on the legal environments; for example, the durations of
licensing and conditions for discontinuation or annulment of licenses. For simplicity, we
suppose that a licensing agreement is good only for one period but extendable
indefinitely as long as both parties agree to keep it.
Let a licensing contract be represented by a triplet {p, s, F}, where p is a price, s is
a market share to the innovator and F is a licensing fee or transfer from the non-innovator
to the innovator. Suppose that the innovator makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the non-
innovator, and firms share innovation if the non-innovator accepts the offer. On the
collusive equilibrium path with an licensing agreement, the non-innovator enjoys the
profit (1 – s)D(p)(p - c–) – F and the non-innovator sD(p)(p - c–) + F per period.
We characterize the optimal contract in three steps. First, if the non-innovator
refuses licensing, firms can still collude as in subsection 3.1, yielding to the non-
innovator the equilibrium profit (1 - δ)D[pm(c–)][pm(c–) - c–] per period. The optimal
licensing fee extracts any gain to the non-innovator; i.e., F is given by
F = (1 – s)D(p)(p - c–) - (1 - δ)D[pm(c–)][pm(c–) - c–].
Using this, the profit to the innovator is written
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D(p)(p - c–) - (1 - δ)D[pm(c–)][pm(c–) - c–].
Since the second term is independent of p, the innovator sets p = pm(c–) to maximize the
above profit. With this pricing, the optimal licensing fee is written
(9) F* = (1 – s)m– - (1 - δ)D[pm(c–)][pm(c–) - c–].
Next, with the optimal price pm(c–), a one-period deviation allows the non-
innovator to capture the entire market less the licensing fee for just one period, after
which it gets limit-priced and loses all the future profits. Therefore, a deviation would
yield
D[pm(c–)][pm(c–)- c–] – F* = sm– + (1 - δ)D[pm(c–)][pm(c–) - c–].
On the other hand, since the optimal licensing fee F* extracts any increase in profit,
keeping his equilibrium profit per period at (1 - δ)D[pm(c–)][pm(c–) - c–] as in subsection
3.1. Thus, the non-innovator has no incentive to deviate if
D[pm(c–)][pm(c–) - c–] ≥ sm– + (1 - δ)D[pm(c–)][pm(c–) - c–].
This simplifies to
δD[pm(c–)][pm(c–) - c–] ≥ sm–.
The optimal market share must satisfy this constraint, and hence we have
s* = δD[pm(c–)][pm(c–) - c–]/m–.
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Since the right-hand side expression of the above equation is less than δ, a comparison
with the counterpart in proposition 1 indicates that licensing results in a smaller market
share for the innovator. In equilibrium, however, due to the licensing fee the innovator
earns a greater net profit equaling:
s*m– + F* = m– - (1 - δ)D[pm(c–)][pm(c–) - c–].
Finally, the licensing agreement must be incentive-compatible for the innovator.
A one-period deviation would yield m– + F* in the current period. As the innovator
switches to limit-pricing in the next period, with the license annulled, the stream of
discounted profits from the next period on sums to δπL/(1 - δ). Thus, a deviation yields
m– + F* + δπL/(1 - δ) = 2m– - D[pm(c–)][pm(c–) - c–] + δπL/(1 - δ)
where (9) is used to get the right-hand side. The innovator has no incentive to deviate if
this sum is less than the equilibrium profits; i.e.,
(s*m– + F*)/(1 - δ) ≥ 2m– - D[pm(c–)][pm(c–) - c–] + δπL/(1 - δ).
Substituting for s* and F* and canceling terms simplifies this to
δ ≥ m–/(2m– - πL) ≡ δA(c–),
the condition identical to (4) in section 3.1. Thus, the condition for collusion in post-
discovery periods is unaffected by licensing. It follows that a greater industry profit due
to cooperation in R&D has no role in the incentive to collude in post-discovery periods.
However, a greater equilibrium industry profit after a discovery raises the
expected profit before a discovery from (vi + vn)/2 to m–/2 in the expression Vc. That is,
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with licensing the collusive equilibrium profit before a discovery is equal to VJ instead of
Vc. On the other hand, the profit from a deviation before a discovery is unaffected by
licensing and equals Vλ. Then, following the procedure of section 4, we can show that
collusion can be maintained in pre-discovery periods for δ ≥ max{δA(c–), 1/2} = δA(c–). In
terms of figure 1, licensing enables firms collude before and after a discovery in regions 1
and 2, while without licensing they could not collude before a discovery in region 2, as
shown in section 3.1. The analysis for regions 3 and 4 is unaffected by licensing.
Now reconsider formation of an RJV. Since licensing enables firms to collude
before and after discovery in regions 1 and 2, formation of an RJV facilitates collusion
only in regions 3 and 4. Further, since firms share innovation with licensing and capture a
greater industry profit after a discovery, an RJV does not generate additional efficiency
gains, and hence does not increase welfare. In regions 3 and 4, an RJV facilitates
collusion and reduces welfare. Without licensing an RJV increased welfare in region 1
due to the efficiency gain and the net effect was ambiguous in region 2. With licensing,
however, an RJV causes no welfare changes in these regions.
In section 1 we indicated that an RJV can facilitate collusion by elimination of
inter-firm asymmetries and generation of a greater industry profit. The analysis of this
section can disentangle these two effects. First, both an RJV and licensing yields the
identical expected collusive equilibrium profits before a discovery equal to VJ. Yet, due
to the post-discovery asymmetry with licensing, firms cannot collude in regions 3 and 4
without forming an RJV. Thus, elimination of the post-discovery asymmetry is
responsible for successful collusion in regions 3 and 4 with an RJV. Second, in region 2
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firms could not collude before a discovery without licensing but can collude with
licensing or an RJV, both of which yields a greater surplus. Thus, collusion in region 2 is
facilitated by the prospect of a greater profit with an RJV.
6. Extensions
 In section we relax the following assumptions of the model. They are (i) non-
drastic innovation, (ii) permanent patent protection, and (iii) Nash threats (punishment by
reversions to repeated play of a one-shot game).
First, suppose innovation is drastic as in Martin (1995). With drastic innovation
an innovator becomes a monopoly so there is no collusion in post-discovery periods.
Thus, the analysis is similar to the one associated with region 3; namely, formation of an
RJV facilitates collusion in post-discovery periods and lowers social welfare, which is
exactly what Martin (1995) has argued.
Second, suppose that patent life is finite. If patent life is, say, T periods, the value
of new technology to the innovator falls from πL/(1 - δ)  under permanent patent
protection to πL(1 - δ
T)/(1 −  δ).20 In the collusive equilibrium finite patent life thus
decreases the value of a deviation, thereby making collusion easier to maintain both
before and after a discovery.
Third, it is well known in the implicit collusion literature that collusion can be
sustained for a lower range of discount factors if firms can commit to a severer
punishment scheme than Nash reversions. In a recent paper Thal (2006) considers such a
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scheme for Bertrand duopoly with asymmetric costs, and finds that a credible punishment
strategy with an Abreu (1986, 1988) stick-and-carrot structure reduces the payoff to the
firm with lowest cost to zero. Although not concerned with the uniqueness of equilibrium
selection, when applied to our model, her analysis implies that there is an optimal
punishment scheme that can reduce the threshold discount factor after a discovery to 1/2
without formation of an RJV. However, it is not clear whether the threshold discount
factor also falls to 1/2 in pre-discovery periods. Nonetheless, in Appendix F we show that
that is the case under the assumption of linear demand. In that case, firms can collude
before and after a discovery at any discount factor greater or equal to 1/2 without forming
an RJV, meaning that cooperation in R&D always improves social welfare through
efficiency gains.
7. Concluding remarks
We examine whether cooperation in R&D leads to product market collusion. Our
model has two firms managing implicitly to maintain the collusive equilibrium while
engaged in a stochastic R&D race. Under competitive R&D, innovation gives rise to an
inter-firm cost asymmetry and can destabilizes collusion when the discount factor is low
or the cost reduction under new technology is large. The prospect that collusion ends with
innovation further destabilizes collusion in pre-discovery periods. Innovation sharing
under cooperative R&D preserves a cost symmetry and also raises industry surplus, both
of which facilitate collusion in product markets. These two effects can be studied
                                                                                                                                                  
20 In period T + 1 the technology becomes public and competition wipes out profits for the innovator.
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separately by considering the intermediate case, in which firms license without forming
an RJV.
Although facilitating collusion, cooperation in R&D does not necessarily decrease
social welfare in the absence of licensing, as sharing of new technology improves
efficiency in production. Although new technology is the driving force for a welfare
improvement, cooperation in R&D is more likely to decrease welfare if the cost falls too
much under new technology.
Our qualitative results are robust to alternative assumptions concerning the type
of innovation (drastic or non-drastic), patent length, and punishment mechanisms. Our
model can be extended further. For example, more complex licensing schemes such as
multi-period binding licensing contracts can be explored within out model. Another
interesting extension would be to the case of quantity-setting firms. Since quantity
competition is less competitive it is generally more difficult to maintain collusion than
with price competition. While we leave these extensions for future research, we believe
that our basic insight and results will remain valid and relevant.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 1. Let δ < δA(c–) be given. Suppose there is a pair (p*, s*),
where p* ≠ pm(c–), such that p* maximizes the innovator’s profit s*m–* = s*D(p*)(p* - c–)
and satisfies the no-deviation constraints for both the innovator and the non-innovator.
Case 1. p* < pm(c–)
Partial collusion is stable if
δ ≥ max {(1 – s*)m–*)/(m–* – πL), s*}
If δ ≥ (1 – s*)m–*)/(m–* – πL) > s*, s* can be increased up to δ, increasing the profit to the
innovator without violating the no-deviation constraint. So, at the optimum the innovator
sets s* = δ. Therefore, we have
δ ≥ (1 – δ)m–*/(m–* – πL)
or
δ ≥ m–*/(2m–* – πL).
But the right-hand side is decreasing in m* for 0 ≤ m–*≤ m–, and hence
δ ≥ m–*/(2m–* – πL) > m–/(2m– – πL) = δA(c–),
which contradicts the assumption δ < δA(c–).
Case: pm(c–) < p* < pm(c–)
There is no deviation if
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δ ≥ max {(m– - s*m–*)/(m– – πL), s*}.
Again, s* can be increased up to δ without violating this constraint so δ = s*. We can
write the above as
δ ≥ (m– - δm–*)/(m– – πL).
that is,
δ ≥ m–/(m– – πL + m–*).
But since m–* < m–
δ ≥ m–/(m– – πL + m–*) > m–/(2m– – πL) = δA(c–),
a contradiction.
Case 3: p* ≥ pm(c–).
The innovator does not deviate if
δ ≥ [m– - (1 – s*)m–*]/m–,
and the non-innovator does not if
δ ≥ (m– – s*m–*)/(m– – πL).
Partial collusion is sustained if both conditions hold. The first must hold with equality,
for otherwise the innovator can increase profit by raising s*. Therefore, s* satisfies
(1 - δ)m– = (1 – s*)m–*.
Using this the second condition can be written
δ(m– – πL) ≥ (m– – s*m–*) = m– + (1 - δ)m– – m–*
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Collecting terms,
δ ≥ [m– + m– – m–*]/[(m– – πL + m–] > m–/(2m– – πL) = δA(c–),
a contradiction. ❏
Appendix B: We show that (6) fails at δ = 1/2. Assume the contrary, and evaluate (6) at δ
= 1/2 to obtain this equivalent condition:
(B1) m– + D[pm(c–)][pm(c–) – c–] – πL – 2m– ≥ 0.
However, we can express the left-hand side of (B1) as
D[pm(c–)][2pm(c–) – c– – c–] – D(c–)(c– – c–) – 2D[pm(c–)][pm(c–) – c–)
< 2D(c–)[pm(c–) – c–] – 2D[pm(c–)][pm(c–) – c–)
< 0,
where the first inequality is obtained from substitution of D(c–) for D[pm(c–)] while the
second follows the fact that pm(c–) is the profit-maximizing price at cost c–. This
contradiction is what we wanted. ❏
Appendix C: We prove Lemma 2. Proof of Result (i) dδB(c–)/dc– < 0. Write δB(c–) = δBto
save space. δB is implicitly defined by (6) or satisfies this implicit function
g(δB, c–) ≡ VJ – Vλ – m– = 0.
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where VJ – Vλ is given by (7). Write g(δB, c–) = g. Straightforward differentiation of (7)
shows that ∂g/∂δB > 0. On the other hand,
sgn {∂g/∂c–} = sgn {∂(VJ – Vλ)/∂c–} = sgn {∂(πi + πn – πL)/∂c–}
The last derivative is
– δBD[pm(c–)] + D(c–) > 0
since pm(c–) > c–. Therefore, by the implicit-function theorem we conclude that
dδB(c–)/dc– = – (∂g/∂c–)/(∂g/∂δB) < 0.
Proof of Result (ii): As c– approaches cd, Vc – Vλ approaches (m–/2)(1 − δφ2). Therefore, if
δ > 1/(2φ2),  (6) holds with strict inequality at the limit c– = cd, that is,
(m–/2)/(1 − δφ2) > m–.
This implies that δB(c–) is bounded from above by 1/(2φ2).
Proof of Result (iii). Suppose that φ2 ≥ 1/2. Then 1/(2φ2) ≤ 1. Hence, 1 > δB(c–) > 1/2 by
result (ii) of lemma 2. On the other hand, δA(c–) approaches unity as c– approaches cd, and
approaches 1/2 as c– nears c–. Thus, the two loci cross each other. ❏
Appendix D. We prove Lemma 3: Let δ be given such that δA(c–) ≤ δ < δB(c–). Suppose
there is a price p* ≠ pm(c–) and the total profit m–* = D(p*)(p* - c–) < m– satisfying
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δ(1 – φ2)[vi + vn - πL/(1 – δ)]/2 + m–*/2
1 – δφ2   ≥ m
–*
But firms cannot collude fully so
m– >  
δ(1 – φ2)[vi + vn - πL/(1 – δ)]/2 + m–/2
1 – δφ2 .
Adding and simplifying
[m– - m–*]/[2(1 - δφ2)] ≥ m– - m–*
which holds only if
δ >1/ (2φ2).
By Lemma 2,
1/(2φ2) > δB(c–).
These two imply δ > δB(c–), a contradiction. ❏
Appendix E: We show that (8) holds with strict inequality at δ = 1/2. First we show:
(E1) m– – πL – m–
= D[pm(c–)][pm(c–) – c–] – D(c–)(c– – c–) – D[pm(c–)][pm(c–) – c–)
> D[pm(c–)][pm(c–) – c–] – D(c–)(c– – c–) – D(c–)[pm(c–) –c–)
= D[pm(c–)][pm(c–) – c–] – D(c–)[pm(c–) – c–) > 0.
Second, evaluate VJ – Vλ at δ = 1/2 to obtain
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VJ – Vλ = 
(1 - φ2)(m–  – πL) + m–  
2 - φ2 .
Subtract m– from it.
(E2) VJ – Vλ – m– = (1 - φ2)(m– – πL – m–)/(2 - φ2) > 0
by (E1). Finally, evaluate the left-hand side of (8) at δ = 1/2 to obtain
(E3) (1 – φ2)m–/2 + φ2(VJ – Vλ)/2
> (1 – φ2)m–/2 + φ2m–/2 
> m–/2,
where the first inequality uses (E2). But (E3) shows that (8) holds with strict inequality at
δ = 1/2. ❏
Appendix F: Since he receives zero profits following a deviation, the innovator has no
incentive to deviate if sm–/(1 – δ) ≥ m–, or s ≥ 1 – δ. Likewise, the non-innovator does not
deviate if s ≤ δ. Thus, 1 – δ ≤ s ≤ δ. At δ = 1/2, this means s = 1/2. Now, modify the pre-
discovery components of b as follows. In state (iv) firms set price equal to c– until a
discovery, after which they switch to the stick-and-carrot strategy described by Thal
(2006). Then, a one-period deviation before a discovery yields zero profits (excluding k)
past the period in which a deviation occurs, regardless of histories. It follows that a
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deviant firm chooses not to invest in R&D investment. With this modification, (6)
becomes
Vc ≥ m–.
Substituting δ = 1/2 and canceling terms, we can write this condition as
m– + D[pm(c–)][pm(c–) – c–] – 2m– ≥ 0.
This condition may or may not hold in general but it does hold under the assumption of
linear demand as can easily be confirmed by directly evaluation of the profits. If it does,
then firms can maintain collusion before and after innovation at any δ ≥ 1/2 as under
cooperative R&D. ❏
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